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338 REED v. NORMAN [ 48 C.2<1 
not be barred by acceptance of the benefits of the judgment 
(as distinguished from a unilateral reservation by the appel-
lant), will not preserve the right to appeal. [5] In regard 
to acceptance of the benefits of the judgment as barring the 
acceptor's appeal, it is said in Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 
214 [259 P.2d 656] : "However, ' ( i) n order to bar the right 
of appeal on the ground of acquiescence, "the acts relied upon 
must be such as to clearly and unmistakably show acquiescence, 
and it must be unconditional, voluntary, and absolute." ' 
(Duncan v. Duncan, 175 Cal. 693, 695 [167 P. 141] .) " 
[6] And it has been held that an agreement that the accept-
ance of the benefits of a judgment shall not bar the right of 
appeal will be recognized and preserves that right. (See 
Succession of Nicholich, (IJa.App.) 167 So. 831; L1:ghtnrr v. 
Board of Sttpervisors, 156 Vrwa 398 [136 N.W. 761] ; Cdy of 
Srattle v. Liberman, 9 Wash. 276 [37 P. 433]; sec cases contra 
169 A.L.R. 985, 1058.) 
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[L.A. No. 24415. In Bank. Apr. 12, 19Ei7.] 
HOY'f REED, Appellant, v. CARL 0. NORMAN et al., 
Rrspondents. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation. 
-A motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judg-
ment in a stockholder's derivative action could not be sustained 
on the ground that plaintiff no longer owned any stock in the 
corporation because of an execution sale where his uncontra-
dicted affidavit, filed in opposition to the motion, stated that 
the execution purchaser's bid was "for and on account of" 
plaintiff, and that any rights or interest in the shares sold at 
execution was for plaintifr's lwncftt. 
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.~-A motion 
to dismiss plaintiff's appt•al fron1 an :HlVPl'S<' judgment in n 
stoLokholdt·r's dPri1 a tin• nction eunld not Ia' sustain<'rl on the 
gronnd that th,rn wns no showing or pl:1intit1''s <·omplianeP 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 6, 7] Corporations,§ 368; [3] Cor-
porations, § 927; [4) Corporations, § 353; [5] Corporations, § 354. 
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with ,.;tvting that nu artion slwll he "insti~ 
tuted or mamt1Jine1l'' unless crcrtain conditions exist, since a 
.Jndgnwnt based 011 H finding tlwt su~h eonditionfi do not exist 
is on the merits of thP case whieh ~hould not hP eonsid<~red on a 
motion to dismiNs the appPal, hut should he determined on the 
appeal itself. 
[3] !d.-Taxation-Penalty for Failure to Pay Tax-Effect of Sus-
pension.-Under Hev. & Tax. Code, §§ 23301, 23302, a corpo-
ration may not prosecute or defend an action, nor appeal from 
an adverse judgment in an action, while its corporate rights 
are suspended for failure to pay taxes. 
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-Gener-
ally, in a derivative action the alleged wrong is a wrong to 
the corporation as such and not to the stockholders individ-
ually, and hence a har to an action by the corporation bars a 
stockholders' action for the corporation. 
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-In a 
stockholder's derivative action for a wrong to the corporation, 
namely, the dissipation of corporate assets by allegedly dis-
honest directors and officers, while the corporate rights of the 
corporation were suspended for failure to pay taxes, where the 
books and records of the corporation were in the hands of the 
mismanaging officers and thus the shareholders were not in a 
position to make a return or compute the franchise tax it would 
not be equitable to permit Hev. & Tax. Code, § 23301, relating 
to nonpayment of franchise taxes, to stand as a shield for 
protecting allegedly dishonest corporate officials. 
[6] ld.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-In a 
stockholder's derivative action for dissipation of corporate 
assets by allegedly dishonest corporate officials while the corpo-
ration's corporate rights were suspended for failure to pay 
taxes, plaintiff's appeal from an adverse ,judgment should not 
be dismissed on the ground of such suspension where defend-
ants had made no claim, prior to their motion to dismiss the 
appeal, that the action could not proceed because of the sus-
pension and it appeared that the records and books of the 
corporation were retained by defendants, and plaintiff, assum-
ing that he could not maintain the action because of the 
suspension, should be given an opportunity of paying the 
taxes and reinstating the corporation. 
[7] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-In a 
stockholder's derivative action for dissipation of corporate 
assets by allegedly dishonest corporate officials while the cor-
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 509. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, §§ 214, 216 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Corporations, § 461 et seq. 
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poration's corporate rights were suspended for failure to pay 
taxes, whether one defendant assumed complete control and 
management of the corporate business to the exclusion of 
plaintiff, as alleged by plaintiff, who apparently owned the 
majority of the stock, may not appropriately be considered on 
a motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judg-
ment. 
MOTION to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy 
and Aubrey N. Irwin, Judges. Motion denied. 
Hy Schwartz for Appellant. 
John E. Haskins, in pro. per., and Raymond R. Roberts for 
Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-This litigation has been here before. It is an 
action commenced in 1950 by plaintiff, a stockholder in Norman 
Decorating Company, Inc., a corporation, against the corpora-
tion and Carl Norman, another stockholder, the main defend-
ants, to contest the validity of an election of corporate directors 
including Norman, to void shares issued to Norman and obtain 
an accounting of corporate funds alleged to have been dis-
sipated by Norman. Judgments against plaintiff were re-
versed on appeal, this court stating that the election of 
directors was illegal, Norman having only 150 shares of the 
500 shares whose issue was authorized. The accounting by 
Norman for corporate assets was left for future determination. 
(Reed v. Norman, 41 Cal.2d 17 [256 P.2d 930]; Reed v. 
Norman,41 Cal.2d901 [256 P.2d 933].) Since then a further 
determination has been made. The trial court sustained de-
fendants' objection to the introduction of any evidence on 
the ground that the complaint, amended complaint and supple-
mental complaint failed to state a cause of action and judgment 
was entered that plaintiff recover nothing and defendants 
"be discharged." Plaintiff now appeals from that judgment. 
On the retrial resulting in the instant judgment, it appears, 
and no real dispute on the subject seems to exist, that the 
action is a derivative action by plaintiff, a stockholder of the 
corporation, Norman Decorating Company, for a wrong to the 
corporation, the dissipation by defendant directors and officers 
of the corporate assets (see Gagnon Co., Inc. v. Nevada Desert 
Inn, Inc., 45 Cal.2d 448 [289 P.2d 466] ; Sutter v. General 
Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal.2d 525 [170 P.2d 898, 167 A.L.R. 
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271]; Klopstock v. 8upcriot· Court, 17 Cal.2d 13 [108 P.2d 
906, 135 A.L.R. 318] ) . The theory of the trial court in ren-
dering the judgment now on appeal was that the action being 
derivative, plaintiff was not entitled to recover because he 
failed to show compliance with section 834 of the Corporations 
Code.* 
Norman has moved to dismiss plaintiff's appeal on the 
ground that it cannot be maintained because (1) plaintiff no 
longer owns any stock in the corporation, (2) there is no 
showing of a compliance by plaintiff with section 834 of the 
Corporations Code, supra, and (3) on January 4, 1952, the 
corporation's right to engage in litigation was suspended for 
failure to pay the state franchise tax under section 23301 of 
the Revenue and Taxation Code. t 
[1] With reference to plaintiff no longer being the owner 
of any stock, it is urged that he lost his stock at execution 
*"(a) No action may be instituted or maintained in the right of any 
domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of 
voting trust certificates representing shares, of such corporation unless 
both of the following conditions exist: 
"(1) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he was a registered 
shareholder or the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of the 
transaction or any part thereof of which he complains or that his shares 
or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon him by operation 
of law from a holder who was a holder at the tin1e of the transaction 
or any part thereof complained of. 
"(2) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity his 
efforts to secure from the board of directors such action as he desires 
and alleges further that he has either informed the corporation or such 
board of directors in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of 
action against each defendant director or delivered to the corporation 
or such board of directors a true copy of the complaint which he proposes 
to file, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the 
reasons for not making such effort. 
"(b) In any such action, at any time within thirty days after service 
of summons upon the corporation or any defendant, the corporation or 
such defendant may move the conrt for an order, upon notice and hearing, 
requiring the plaintiff to furnish security as hereinafter provided. Such 
motion may be based upon one or more of the following grounds: 
"(1) That there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution of 
the canse of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party 
will benefit the corporation or its secnrity holders; 
"(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not 
participate in the transaction complained of in any capacity. 
''The court on application of the corporation or any defendant may, 
for good canse shown, extend such 30-day period for an additional period 
or periods not exceeding sixty days." (Corp. Code, § 834; Hogan v. 
Ingold, 38 Cal.2d 802 [243 P.2d 1, 32 A.L.R.2d 8341.) 
tExcept for the purpose of amending articles of incorporation for a 
new name the ''corporate powers, rights and privileges . . . shall be 
suspended'' for failure to pay the franchise tax. (Rev. & 'l'ax. Code 
§ 23301.) ' 
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sale after the judgment from which the appeal is taken. The 
theory is that the question of his right to recover for the 
corporation is moot because by reason of his no longer holding 
stock he no longer has any interest in the corporation or any 
recovery by it. Defendant Norman in his affidavit in support 
of the motion to dismiss the appeal state::; that on April 4, 
1956, plaintiff Reed's stock was sold under a writ of execution 
to a Marlow Baar and since then plaintiff has not been a 
stockholder. He attaches to his notice of motion an exhibit 
entitled "Certificate of Sale" by a marshal, but it states 
therein that all of Nonnan's stock (rather than plaintiff's) was 
sold to Baar. Norman has offered to have that certificate cor-
rected. Apparently the writ was issued pending the instant 
appeal on that part of the judgment on appeal which awarded 
$3,768.10 costs against plaintiff and in favor of the corpora-
tion, Norman, and another defendant. Plaintiff in his noticf' 
of appeal filed March 13, 1956, lists the order taxing costs 
and denying plaintiff's motion to strike costs, but those orders 
do not appear in the reeord and plaintiff has made no request 
to augment the record. Plaintiff in his opposition to the 
motion to dismiss the appeal elaims that the sale was invalid 
because proper notire was not given the corporation and that 
he has the rights of Baar, the purchaser at the execution sale. 
Plaintiff's uncontradicted affidavit states that the bid of 
Baar, the execution purchaser, was "for and on account of" 
plaintiff ''and that any rights or any interest in said shares 
[sold at execution] by reason of said bid is for the benefit 
of" plaintiff "and that he is the beneficial owner of any 
such interest and rights." It is thus clear that plaintiff has 
not lost his title to the stock and hence the motion to dismiss 
is not sustainable on that ground. For that reason we need 
not and do not pass upon the validity of the sale or whether, 
if valid, it would render the appeal moot. 
[2] As to the question of failure to comply with section 
884 of the Corporations Code, S1tpra, the case falls within tl1e 
general rule that the merits of a case should not be considerf'd 
on a motion to dismiss the appeal; it should be determined on 
the appeal itself. (Estate of Wnnderlc, 30 Cal.2d 274 [181 
P.2d 87 41, and cases cited.) It iR trne that section 834 states 
that no aetion shall be '' institnted or maintained'' unles,; 
<·t~rtain eolHlitions exist and the eomplaint mnst show whether 
or not those eonditiow; <•xist. A finding that thPy do not may 
result in a dismissal of the action, and a judgment based upon 
such a finding is on the merits of that phase of the case 
Apr. l!JG?] Hmw v. NoRMAN 
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and is l'<'\'iewnbl<~ on appeal til!~ ;.:amr <!c; illl,Y ntiJpr judgment 
of rhsmis~aL The rpwstjon ii' 11·hether tlw trial ro1ut. was 
correct ill d'•ti'J'll1ining b,\' its jndgmr>nl that ti!Py rlid not PXist. 
[3, 4] On the isstw of cmspem;ion of the eorporation for 
failure to pay fraueh ise tax, it is true that under the corpora-
tion law (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 23301, 23302, supra) the cor-
poration may not prosecute or defend an action, nor appeal 
f1·om au adverse judgmellt in an action while its corporate 
rights are suspended for failure to pay taxes (Boyle v. Lake-
view Creamery Co., 9 Cal.2d 16 [68 P.2d 968]; Ocean Park 
etc. Co. v. Pacijic Auto Park Co., 37 Cal.App.2d J58 [98 P.2d 
1068] ; Baker v. F'errel, 78 Cai.App.2d 578 [177 P.2d 973]; 
Fidelity Metals Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cai.App.2d 377 [175 P.2d 
592]), and, generally, in a rlrrivative aetion the wrong is "to 
the corporation as such and not the stoekholders individually, 
hem~e a bar to an action by the stockholders for the corpora-
tion." (Gagnon Co., Inc. v. Nevada Desert Inn, Inc., supra, 
45 Cal.2d 448, 453.) [5] But here, in a stockholders' deriva-
tive aetion, the corporation is forced to be a party because 
any recovery goes through the corporate channel and thus 
enhanees the stockholders' interest therein. 'l'he corporation 
is not attempting to e:xereise its rights as a eorporation. It is 
being used as a JWrr>ssary rhannPl hy the shareholders. The 
books and rreords of the eorporation arc in the hands of the 
mismanaging officers aceonling to plaintiff's complaints and 
thus the shareholders are not in a position to make a return 
or compute the franchise tax. In such a case it is not equitable 
to permit section 23301 of the Reyenue and Taxation Code to 
stand as a shield for protecting allegedly dishonest corporate 
officials. The corporation is not enjoying any of the privileges 
aceorded to such entities; it is more analogous to the winding 
np of the business. In Weinert v. Kinkel, 296 N.Y. 151 [71 
N.E.2d 445, 446], the stockholders' derivative action was for 
breach of fiduciary duty of direetors to the eorporation. The 
action was commenced after the eorporation had been "dis-
solved for nonpayment of taxes,'' yrt the court held the cor-
poration vvas not an indispensable party, stating: ''The techni-
eal argnment made by appellants disregards l'E'alities and 
should not prrvail. Tt has been reeognized that the court may 
dispense with the presenee of a defunct corporation in a 
derivative action, if the circumstances warrant such exercise of 
its equitable powers. Cohen v. Dana, 287 N.Y. 405, 410, 411 
r 40 N.E.2d 227, 2301; N Ol'man v. General American Transp. 
0orp., 181 Mis<·. 2~:i f47 N.Y.S.2d 390], affirmed 267 App. 
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Div. 758 [45 N.Y.S.2d 929]; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 238 Mass. 
403 [131 N.E. 177]; 13 Fletcher on Corporations, § 5997. 
Such circumstances are here present. As observed by the 
learned referee, the defendant directors dominated and con-
trolled the board; they were residents of New York; the 
corporation's business was clone here; and, as provided by the 
by-laws and authorized by the certificate of incorporation, the 
corporate meetings were held in this State. Beyond that, 
the fictitious corporate person disappeared upon dissolution, 
and whatever assets it might have had at that time belonged 
thereafter, in equity at least, to the stockholders who are thus 
the equitable owners of this claim against defendants. Hence, 
as the referee remarked, 'the presence of a representative of 
the artificial person would add no material element to the 
litigation.'" (See Carruthers v. Jack Waite Mining Co., 
306 N.Y. 136 [116 N.E.2cl 286] ; 172 A.L.R. 691.) Smith v. 
Lewis, 211 Cal. 294 [295 P. 37], states a contrary rule but 
there it does not appear that the records and books of the 
corporation were in the hands of the defaulting corporate 
officers and unavailable to the shareholder. 
[6] For another reason the appeal should not be dismissed 
on the last mentioned ground. Although the corporation was 
suspended for nonpayment of taxes January 4, 1952, the for-
mer appeal was decided on May 12, 1953, and the judgment 
herein was entered on January 24, 1956, defendants have at 
no time until the present motion to dismiss the appeal made 
any claim that the action could not proceed because of the 
suspension and it appears that the records and books of the 
corporation have been retained by defendants. It would thus 
seem that plaintiff, even assuming he could not maintain the 
action because of the suspension, should be given an opportu-
nity of paying the taxes and reinstating the corporation.* 
[7] Under the holding in the former decisions in this case 
( 41 Cal.2d 17; 41 Cal.2d 901) Norman was the legal owner 
·«'Any taxpayer which has suffered the suspension or forfeiture pro· 
vided for in Section 23301 may be relieved therefrom upon making 
application therefore in writing to the Franchise Tax Board and upon 
payment of the tax and the interest and penalties for nonpayment of 
which the suspension or forfeiture occurred, together with all other taxes, 
deficiencies, interest and penalties due under this part, and upon the 
issuance by the Franchise Tax Board of a certificate of revivor. Applica-
tion for such certificate on behalf of any domestic bank or corporation 
which has suffered such suspension may be made by any stockholder or 
creditor or by a majority of the surviving trustees or directors thereof; 
application for such certificate may be made by any foreign bank or 
corporation which has suffered such forfeiture or by any stockholder or 
creditor thereof." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 23305.) 
Apr.1957] PEOPLE V. HARDENBROOK 
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of only 150 shares of the corporation here involved and Reed 
was the legal owner of 245 shares ( 41 Cal.2d 17). By virtue 
of this situation Norman now contends that Reed could have 
assumed control of the corporation and has no right to bring 
a derivative action (see Jones v. Rc-JJ1ine Oil Co., 47 Cal.App. 
2d 832 [119 P.2d 219]) but this contention may not now be 
considered as it does not appear that plaintiff has assumed 
control of the corporation and he alleges that the defendants 
have control of all the books and records of the corporation. 
Although he may own the majority of the stock by reason of 
the holding above mentioned, he has alleged and maintained 
throughout this litigation that Norman has assumed complete 
control and management of the business of the corporation 
to the exclusion of plaintiff. That is a matter that should be 
addressed to the trial court; it may not appropriately be 
considered on a motion to dismiss the appeal. 
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5939. In Bank. Apr. 12, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE Respondent, v. nA. VID J. HARDEN-
BROOK, Appellant. 
[1] Witnesses- Corroboration- Prior Consistent Statements. -
Where the opposition has assailed the testimony of a witness 
as being of recent fabrication, an exception to the hearsay rule 
allows the admission of evidence of statements or conduct 
prior to the claimed fabrication and consistent with the testi-
mony of the witness at the trial, not to prove the facts of the 
case, but as tending· to show that the witness has not been 
[1] Admissibility for purpose of supporting impeached witness, 
of prior statements by him consistent with his testimony, note, 140 
A.L.R. 21. See also Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 153; Am.Jur., Witnesses, 
§ 817 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Witnesses, ~ 280; [3] Homicide, 
§58; [4] Homicide,§ 62; [5] Criminal Law,§ 1404(14); [6] Crimi-
nal Law, § 1407(6); [7] Criminal Law, § 1404(12); [8] Criminal 
Law, § 1404(13); [9] Criminal Law, § 1092. 
